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I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys significant developments in intellectual property
(IP) law during the past year (i.e., 2016 or the Survey period).1 This arti-
cle reviews IP law developments that are likely to be influential in the
evolution of Texas IP jurisprudence. Thus, the cases cited focus on the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. For developments in copyright and trademark law,
although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s authority is
binding, other circuits are considered highly persuasive.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided several cases involving IP issues.2 In
patents, the Supreme Court showed particular interest in design patent
damages and whether an infringer should be liable for the full extent of
the profit even where the infringing design only accounts for a portion of
the overall product.3 The Supreme Court also considered whether the
two-part Seagate test for enhanced damages is consistent with the Patent
Act.4 As for administrative proceedings, the Supreme Court addressed
whether an inter partes review was improperly instituted and whether it is
appropriate to apply the “broadest reasonable construction” standard for
claim construction in such proceedings.5
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit also made important
developments to its patent law jurisprudence.6 For example, the Federal
Circuit clarified the application of Alice by finding in one case that not all
computer-related inventions are directed towards abstract ideas,7 and in
another, that even where a computer-related patent is directed to an ab-
stract idea, it may still contain an inventive concept that renders the in-
vention patentable.8
1. The views expressed in this article are the views of the individual authors and are
not necessarily those of Haynes and Boone, LLP, its attorneys, or any of its clients.
2. See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016); Halo Elecs. v. Pulse
Elecs., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (2016); Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139
(2016).
3. See Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 432.
4. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1931.
5. See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2139.
6. See, e.g., Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
7. See id. at 1336.
8. See Bascom Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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In copyright, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit deter-
mined that the Copyright Act protects graphic features of a design even
where those features cannot be physically separated from the “useful
article.”9
In trademark, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit con-
firmed that the bar to show “use in commerce” for the purposes of ob-
taining a federal trademark registration is low, considering the breadth of
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.10 Also, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit took a broad look at the Lanham Act,
finding that owners of foreign trademarks, even with no domestic use, are
eligible to bring false association, false advertising, and trademark cancel-
lation actions in the United States.11
II. PATENT UPDATE
A. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ON PATENTS
1. Damages Apportionment for Design Patents—Samsung v. Apple
In Samsung v. Apple, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that design
patent damages are limited to the profit attributable to the patented por-
tion or component of a multi-component end product.12
At issue were a few Samsung smartphones that Apple asserted in-
fringed a number of Apple-owned design patents related to the iPhone.
Apple’s design patents included, among other elements, coverage related
to a smartphone having a black rectangular face with rounded corners
and a “grid of 16 colorful icons on a black screen.”13 In 2011, Apple initi-
ated the infringement suit against Samsung and eventually won a $399
million award.14 The award value was based on the damages remedy
found in § 289 of the Patent Act, which provides that a person found to
manufacture or sell an infringing “article of manufacture . . . shall be lia-
ble to the owner to the extent of his total profit[.]”15
On appeal, Samsung argued that the damages should be limited be-
cause Samsung’s entire profits were not attributable solely to the front
portion (i.e., the infringing portion) of Samsung’s smartphones.16 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was not persuaded and, in
upholding the award, held that the only permissible “article of manufac-
ture” for the purposes of § 289 had to be the entire smartphone because
consumers could not purchase the face of the phone separately from the
9. See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.
2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
10. See Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986, 992–95 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
11. See Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 715 (4th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1202 (2017).
12. See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 433 (2016).
13. See id.
14. Id. at 434.
15. Id. at 432 (quoting Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012)).
16. Id. at 434.
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rest of the device.17
In the first design patent ruling in over a century, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed the Federal Circuit, finding that the lower court’s ruling
was inconsistent with the language of the statute.18 The Supreme Court
began by noting that arriving at a damages award under § 289 requires a
two-step test, including (1) “identify[ing] the ‘article of manufacture’ to
which the infringed design has been applied”; and (2) calculating the in-
fringing party’s total profits derived from the identified “article of
manufacture.”19
The case hinged on the meaning of “article of manufacture.” Relying
heavily on a plain language analysis, the Supreme Court held that “article
of manufacture” can refer to both “a [final] product sold to a consumer
and a component of that product.”20 Further, the Supreme Court found
that this broad reading was consistent with other portions of the Patent
Act pertaining to design patents. For example, “35 U.S.C. § 171(a) . . .
makes ‘new, original and ornamental design[s] for an article of manufac-
ture’ eligible for design patent protection,” and design patents are often
obtained on “only a component of a multicomponent product.”21 Thus, it
followed that “article of manufacture” in § 289 could refer to a single
component of a multicomponent product.22
In the end, the Supreme Court declined to set out a test for determin-
ing what the relevant article of manufacture is and remanded the case to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.23 It will be up to the
lower courts to develop a workable legal standard going forward. From a
practice standpoint, applicants should always consider a design patent on
the entire product. While this strategy will not always prove effective, it
should be considered in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling and par-
ticularly due to the difficulties that will inevitably arise from attempting
to determine the dollar value attributable to individual components of a
multicomponent product.
2. Seagate Again—Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics
The U.S. Supreme Court in Halo v. Pulse focused on whether the two-
part Seagate test for enhanced damages is consistent with the Patent
Act.24 Halo Electronics, Inc. (Halo) sued Pulse Electronics Corporation
(Pulse) for patent infringement of its “patents for electronic packages
containing transformers designed to be mounted to the surface of circuit






22. Id. at 436.
23. Id.
24. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc. 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
25. Id. at 1930.
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that Pulse acted willfully.26 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Nevada refused to award enhanced damages because Halo did not show
“objective recklessness under the first step of Seagate.”27 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding.28
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit.29
The Supreme Court held, for several reasons, that the Seagate test is not
consistent with § 284 of the Patent Act, which provides that “the court
may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or
assessed.”30
First, the statute contains “no explicit limit or condition on when en-
hanced damages are appropriate.”31 Second, the statute gives the courts a
better ability to punish culpable behavior.32 The Seagate test requires an
objectively reckless finding in every case, which is a rigid standard.33
There is no ability for the court to use its discretion to punish intentional
or knowing behavior, even if the behavior is not “objectively reckless.”34
Third, Seagate is inconsistent with the Patent Act.35 Seagate “requires
clear and convincing evidence to prove recklessness.”36 The Patent Act
“imposes no specific evidentiary burden, much less such a high one.”37
Thus, the Patent Act allows for “district courts to punish the full range of
culpable behavior.”38
The Supreme Court found that § 284 “gives district courts the discre-
tion to award enhanced damages against those guilty of patent infringe-
ment,” whereas Seagate “unduly confines the ability of [the] district
courts to exercise . . . discretion.”39 As a result, the Supreme Court abro-
gated the Seagate test.40
3. More Clarification on Inter Partes Review—Cuozzo v. Lee
In Cuozzo v. Lee, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed two important
questions regarding inter partes review.41 First, whether an inter partes
review was improperly instituted.42 Second, whether the Board “improp-
erly used the interpretive standard set forth in the Patent Office’s regula-
tion (i.e., it gave those claims their ‘broadest reasonable construction’ . . .
26. Id. at 1931.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1935–36.
30. Id. at 1931 (quoting Patent Act, 25 U.S.C. § 284 (2012)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1932.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1933.
35. Id. at 1934.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1933.
39. Id. at 1935.
40. Id.
41. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
42. Id. at 2139.
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).”43
Petitioner Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC (Cuozzo) owned a patent
covering “a speedometer that will show a driver when he is driving above
the speed limit” by turning a speedometer needle red when a driver is
going over the limit.44 “In 2012, Garmin International, Inc., and Garmin
USA, Inc., filed a petition seeking inter partes review of the Cuozzo Pat-
ent’s 20 claims.”45 “Garmin backed up its request by stating, for example,
that the invention described in claim 17 was obvious in light of three prior
patents . . . .”46 The Board not only agreed to review claim 17, but also
claims 10 and 14 because “claim 17 depends on claim 14 which depends
on claim 10[.]”47The Board found “claims 10, 14, and 17 . . . obvious[.]”48
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that § 314(d)
made the “Patent Office’s decision to institute inter partes review ‘nonap-
pealable,’ and it concluded that the Patent Office’s regulation was a rea-
sonable exercise of the agency’s rulemaking authority.”49 Cuozzo filed for
certiorari.50
The U.S. Supreme Court held that “§ 314(d) bars Cuozzo’s efforts to
attack the Patent Office’s determination to institute inter partes review”
for several reasons.51 First, Congress told the Patent Office to “determine
whether inter partes review should proceed” and that “the agency’s deci-
sion is ‘final’ and ‘nonappealable.’”52 Second, Cuozzo merely challenged
the Patent Office’s determination regarding the “‘reasonable likelihood’
of success ‘with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged.’”53
The Supreme Court clarified that the current case does not extend to
precluding review of “constitutional questions.”54 For example, the Su-
preme Court specifically mentioned that it is not precluding
review of a final decision where a petition fails to give “sufficient
notice” such that there is a due process problem with the entire pro-
ceeding, nor does [the Court’s] interpretation enable the agency to
act outside its statutory limits by, for example, canceling a patent
claim for “indefiniteness under § 112” in inter partes review.55
The Supreme Court also upheld the validity of the use of the broadest
reasonable construction standard for several reasons. In Cuozzo’s view,
Congress “must have designed inter partes review as a ‘surrogate for
court proceedings’” and, if Congress did create a “surrogate,” it would
43. Id.





49. Id. at 2134.
50. Id. at 2139.
51. Id. at 2142.
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have intended that the Patent Office apply the “ordinary meaning stan-
dard,” like in district courts, instead of the broadest reasonable construc-
tion standard that patent examiners apply.56 However, the Supreme
Court reasoned, “inter partes review is less like a judicial proceeding and
more like a specialized agency proceeding.”57 For example, challengers
do not need to remain in the proceeding and may lack constitutional
standing.58 Furthermore, “the burden of proof in inter partes review is
different than” in the district court, where “the challenger (or the Patent
Office) must establish unpatentability ‘by a preponderance of the evi-
dence’ [instead of] ‘clear and convincing evidence.’”59
Further, “neither the statutory language, its purpose, [n]or its history
suggest that Congress considered what standard the agency should apply
when reviewing a patent claim in inter partes review.”60 An “express del-
egation of rulemaking authority” exists in § 301(d) because Congress
never clarified which claim construction standard is “proper.”61
The Supreme Court also held “that the regulation represents a reason-
able exercise of rulemaking authority that Congress delegated to the Pat-
ent Office.”62 First, “construing a patent claim according to its broadest
reasonable construction helps to protect the public” by “ensur[ing] preci-
sion while avoiding overly broad claims.”63 Second, the “Patent Office
has used this standard for more than 100 years.”64 Third, the Supreme
Court found that the broadest reasonable construction is fair because the
patent owner may amend the claims during the inter partes review pro-
cess.65 Finally, other Patent Office proceedings use the broadest reasona-
ble construction standard.66 The Supreme Court disregarded Cuozzo’s
argument that the broadest reasonable construction standard may pro-
duce inconsistent results when combined with the district court’s “ordi-
nary meaning standard.”67
Two judges dissented, finding that Congress did not intend to “shield
the Patent Office’s compliance—or noncompliance—with these limits
from all judicial scrutiny.”68 Instead, “Congress required only that judi-
cial review, including of issues bearing on the institution of patent review
proceedings, be channeled through an appeal from the agency’s final
decision.”69
56. Id. at 2143.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2143–44.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2144.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2144–45.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2146.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2149.
69. Id.
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B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PATENTS
1. Alice Reversals—Enfish and Bascom Global
Using the recent Alice framework, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit found “that the claims are not directed to an abstract
idea.”70 The first step for determining whether an application covers a
patent eligible idea is to “determine whether the claims at issue are di-
rected to a patent-ineligible concept.”71 The second step is to “consider
the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combina-
tion’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature
of the claim’ into a patent eligible application.”72
In the Alice portion of Enfish v. Microsoft, the Federal Circuit found an
example of a patentable idea that fulfills step one of the Alice frame-
work.73 Enfish sued Microsoft for “infringement of several patents re-
lated to a ‘self-referential’ database.”74 The U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California found on summary judgment that “all
claims [are] invalid as ineligible under § 101[.]”75 Enfish appealed.76
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that there is a lack of guidance in
determining whether a computer-related patent is an abstract idea. The
Federal Circuit admitted that the “Supreme Court has not established a
definitive rule to determine what constitutes an ‘abstract idea’ sufficient
to satisfy the first step of the Mayo/Alice inquiry.”77 Instead, “both [the
Federal Circuit] and the Supreme Court have found it sufficient to com-
pare claims at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an
abstract idea in previous cases.”78
Enfish was focused on the first step of the Alice framework, which is to
“determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible
concept.”79 It is not enough to “simply ask whether the claims involve a
patent-ineligible concept, because essentially every routinely patent-eligi-
ble claim involving physical products and actions involves a law of nature
and/or natural phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical
world.”80 Instead, the focus should be on whether the claims’ character
“as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.”81
The Federal Circuit used Enfish as an opportunity to make several clar-
ifications about Alice. First, the holding in Alice does not mean that “all
70. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
71. Id. at 1334 (quoting Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S. Ct. 2347,
2355 (2014)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1335.
74. Id. at 1330.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1334.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1335.
81. Id. (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346
(Fed. Cir. 2015)).
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improvements in computer-related technology are inherently abstract
. . . . Indeed, some improvements in computer-related technology when
appropriately claimed are undoubtedly not abstract, such as a chip archi-
tecture, an LED display, and the like.”82 Furthermore, it is not true “that
claims directed to software, as opposed to hardware, are inherently ab-
stract and therefore only properly analyzed at the second step of the Al-
ice analysis.”83
Second, at the first step of the Alice analysis it is “relevant to ask
whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer function-
ality versus being directed to an abstract idea.”84 The invention at issue is
directed towards a self-referential table and is “a specific type of data
structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves
data in memory.”85 As a result, the Federal Circuit found that the claims
in the current case focus “on an improvement to computer functionality
itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its
ordinary capacity.”86
Third, the claims in Alice were abstract because they “can readily be
understood as simply adding conventional computer components to well-
known business practices.”87 The fact that the improvement at issue “is
not defined by reference to ‘physical’ components does not doom the
claims. To hold otherwise risks resurrecting a bright-line machine-or-
transformation test.”88
The Federal Circuit admitted that “[m]uch of the advancement made in
computer technology consists of improvements to software that, by their
very nature, may not be defined by particular physical features but rather
by logical structures and processes.”89 Moreover, “[w]e do not see in Bil-
ski or Alice, or our cases, an exclusion to patenting this large field of
technological progress.”90
The Federal Circuit continued to distinguish the current case from Al-
ice by stating, “we are not faced with a situation where general-purpose
computer components are added post-hoc to a fundamental economic
practice or mathematical equation.”91 Instead, “the claims are directed to
a specific implementation of a solution to a problem in the software
arts.”92 Thus, the claims were not “directed to an abstract idea.”
Similar to Enfish, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reversed a lower court, finding that a patent on filtering internet content
82. Id. at 1335.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1339.
86. Id. at 1336.
87. Id. at 1338.
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improves computer function and is not an abstract idea.93 In the Alice
portion of Bascom Global v. AT&T, the Federal Circuit found an exam-
ple of an inventive step under the second step of the Alice framework.94
Bascom Global owns a patent which claims a method and system to
provide customizable filtering for Internet content. The filtering process
occurs at the “remote ISP server by taking advantage of the technical
capability of certain communication networks.”95 The patent claims that
the patented invention is novel because “no one had previously provided
customized filters at a remote server.”96
Bascom Global sued AT&T for patent infringement and AT&T moved
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).97 AT&T claimed that the patent was in-
valid under § 101 because “performing the filtering on the Internet does
not make the idea nonabstract.”98 The district court agreed with AT&T
because “content provided on the Internet is not fundamentally different
from content observed, read, and interacted with through other mediums
like books, magazines, television, or movies.”99 Bascom Global
appealed.100
The Federal Circuit found that the analysis would fall under the second
step of the Alice framework because the patent is directed to an abstract
idea.101 Filtering “content is an abstract idea because it is a longstanding,
well-known method of organizing human behavior, similar to concepts
previously found to be abstract.”102 The Federal Circuit compared and
contrasted Enfish, saying that unlike Enfish, the current case presents a
“close call[ ] about how to characterize what the claims are directed
to.”103 Furthermore, “the claims and their specific limitations do not
readily lend themselves to a step-one finding that they are directed to a
nonabstract idea.”104 As a result, the Federal Circuit evaluated the nar-
rowing effect of the claim limitations under step two of the Alice
framework.
An abstract idea is transformed into a patent-eligible invention when
there is an inventive concept.105 The inventive concept “must be signifi-
cantly more than the abstract idea itself, and cannot simply be an instruc-
tion to implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer.”106
Moreover, the “inventive concept inquiry requires more than recognizing




96. Id. at 1345.
97. Id. at 1346; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1346–47.
100. Id. at 1347.
101. Id. at 1348.
102. Id.
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that each claim element, by itself, was known in the art.”107 In the current
case, “prior art filters were either susceptible to hacking and dependent
on local hardware and software, or confined to an inflexible one-size-fits-
all scheme.”108 Furthermore, the claims do not “preempt all ways of fil-
tering content on the Internet; rather, they recite a specific, discrete im-
plementation of the abstract idea of filtering content.”109 Moreover, the
“claims carve out a specific location for the filtering system (a remote ISP
server) and require the filtering system to give users the ability to custom-
ize filtering for their individual network accounts.”110
Bascom Global is an example of claims that pass step two of Alice.
Claims directed to an abstract idea are still patent eligible when an inven-
tive concept may be found.111 This was the case in Bascom Global, where
claims directed towards the abstract idea of filtering content passed Alice
because an inventive concept was found.112
Both Enfish and Bascom Global assist patent applicants in drafting
patent applications to overcome § 101 rejections. Enfish clarifies Alice by
finding that not all computer-related inventions are directed towards ab-
stract ideas.113 Bascom Global gives an example of a case where a com-
puter-related patent is directed to an abstract idea but contains an
inventive concept that renders the invention patentable.114
2. Patent Venue is Front and Center—In re TC Heartland
In re TC Heartland addresses the hot topic of patent litigation venue.115
Kraft claimed that Heartland’s “liquid water enhancer products” in-
fringed three of Kraft’s patents.116 Heartland is a limited liability com-
pany organized under Indiana law.117 Heartland is also headquartered in
Indiana.118 Kraft is organized under Delaware law.119 Kraft’s principal
place of business is Illinois.120
Kraft filed suit against Heartland in the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Delaware.121 Heartland moved to dismiss for lack of personal ju-
risdiction.122 Heartland also “moved to either dismiss . . . or transfer
venue to the Southern District of Indiana under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and
107. Id. at 1350.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1352.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp. 822 F3d 1327, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
114. Bascom Glob., 827 F3d at 1352.
115. In re TC Heartland LLC 821 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d, TC Heartland
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1406.”123
Heartland claimed that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in
Delaware because Heartland is “not registered to do business in Dela-
ware, has no local presence in Delaware, has not entered into any supply
contracts in Delaware or called on any accounts there to solicit sales.”124
Furthermore, even though Heartland admitted to shipping orders of the
accused products to Delaware, the shipments were about “2% of Heart-
land’s total sales of the accused products” for the year.125
The Magistrate Judge found that it “had specific personal jurisdiction
over Heartland for claims involving the accused products.”126 The district
court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and denied Heartland’s mo-
tions.127 Heartland petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit for a writ of mandamus to “direct the U.S. District Court for the
District of Delaware to either dismiss or transfer the patent infringement
suit filed against it by Kraft.”128
The Federal Circuit held that precedent required the denial of Heart-
land’s petition for writ of mandamus.129 The Federal Circuit was not per-
suaded by Heartland’s argument that it “does not ‘reside’ in Delaware for
venue purposes according to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).”130 “Heartland argued
that Congress’[s] 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 . . . effectively
overruled VE Holding.”131 The court in VE Holding held that “the defini-
tion of corporate residence in the general venue statute, § 1391(c), ap-
plied to the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400.”132
The Federal Circuit was not persuaded by Heartland’s argument for
several reasons. First, “Congressional reports have repeatedly recognized
that VE Holding is the prevailing law.”133 Second, Congress’s amend-
ment of § 1391 broadened, not narrowed, the definition of corporate resi-
dence.134 Third, “the patent venue statute itself does not define corporate
residence.”135 As a result, “there is no statutory ‘law’ that would satisfy
Heartland’s claim that Congress intended in 2011 to render § 1391(c)’s
definition of corporate residence inapplicable to venue for patent
cases.”136
The Federal Circuit did not agree with Heartland’s argument that the
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civil action.”137 In Beverly Hills Fan, the Federal Circuit held “that the
due process requirement that a defendant have sufficient minimum con-
tacts with the forum was met where a non-resident defendant purpose-
fully shipped accused products into the forum through an established
distribution channel and the cause of action for patent infringement was
alleged to arise out of those activities.”138 The Federal Circuit found that
Heartland had minimum contacts because it “shipped orders of the ac-
cused products directly to Delaware under contracts with what it charac-
terizes as ‘two national accounts’ that are headquartered outside of
Delaware.”139 Furthermore, Heartland did not “argue that the district
court’s exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable nor d[id] it dispute that the
balance of the plaintiff’s and forum state’s interests against the burdens
imposed on it is any different than those in Beverly Hills Fan.”140 The
Federal Circuit found that “Heartland has thus failed to show that its
right to mandamus is clear and indisputable.”141
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 14, 2016, re-
garding the issue of where a domestic corporation “resides” for purposes
of the patent venue statute.142 The Survey for the next Survey period will
report on the Supreme Court’s decision and the decision’s impact on the
future of patent suit filings.
3. “First Sale” Doctrine for Patents and Copyright—Kirtsaeng v. John
Wiley & Sons and Lexmark v. Impression Products
In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng found that a first author-
ized sale, which takes place outside of the United States, exhausts the
copyright owner’s exclusive right of distribution under U.S. copyright
law.143 Even though Kirtsaeng was a copyright case, its impact has also
raised the issue of patent exhaustion. In the 2016 Lexmark decision, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that Kirtsaeng does
not have the same impact on patent law as it does on copyright law,144
but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed this holding after the Survey
period.145
Publisher John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Wiley) sued Kirtsaeng, a domestic
reseller, for copyright infringement.146 Wiley’s foreign subsidiary pub-
lished, printed, and sold foreign editions of Wiley’s textbooks abroad.147
137. Id. at 1341.
138. Id. at 1344.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1345. Readers should take note that the U.S. Supreme Court reversed this
decision after the Survey period. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137
S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
142. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016).
143. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
144. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 727 (Fed. Cir. 2016),
rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
145. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1532 (2017).
146. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1352.
147. Id.
250 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 3
The books contained statements that the books should not be taken into
the United States.148 Kirtsaeng moved to the United States and had his
family and friends purchase Wiley’s textbooks in Thailand and mail the
textbooks to the United States.149 Kirtsaeng sold the books, reimbursed
his family and friends, and pocketed the profit.150
Wiley claimed that Kirtsaeng infringed under 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).151
Kirtsaeng argued that his actions were protected under the “first sale”
doctrine because the “books were ‘lawfully made’ and acquired legiti-
mately[.]”152 As a result, Kirtsaeng believed that the first sale doctrine
allowed for the books to be imported and resold.153 The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York disagreed with Kirtsaeng’s
arguments and found that the first sale doctrine did not apply to goods
made abroad.154 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s decision.155
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the Second Circuit and held
that the “first sale” doctrine applies to copyrighted works lawfully made
abroad.156 For several reasons, the Supreme Court found that the phrase
“lawfully made under this title” from the Copyright Act does not have a
geographical interpretation.157 First, the language of the statute is silent
regarding geography.158 Second, “Congress did not have geography in
mind when writing” the statue.159 There was no previous geographical
limitation before Congress changed that statutory language.160 Further-
more, Congress did not implicitly add a geographical limitation in the
language of the statute.161 Third, a geographical limitation would nega-
tively impact libraries, used-book dealers, technology companies, con-
sumer-goods retailers, and museums.162 For example, if the Copyright
Act does contain a geographical limitation, a library would be required to
track down foreign “heirs of copyright owners” for permission to display
a work.163
As a result, the Supreme Court claimed that “[w]hether copyright own-
ers should, or should not, have more than ordinary commercial power to
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the Supreme Court found that foreign sales exhaust in copyright.165
In Lexmark, the Federal Circuit found that a first sale abroad, without
the approval of the U.S. patentee, does not exhaust patent rights.166
Lexmark makes and sells printer and toner cartridges and also owns
patents related to the printer and toner cartridges and their use.167 Im-
pression resold the cartridges, in both the United States and abroad, after
they had already been used.168 In order for the cartridges to be reused,
Impression had a third party modify the cartridges.169 Lexmark sued for
patent infringement.170 Impression claimed that Lexmark’s patent rights
were exhausted.171 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio held that Lexmark’s patent rights were not “exhausted upon the
first authorized sale abroad.”172
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed the issue
of whether it should overrule Jazz Photo in light of Kirtsaeng.173 The Fed-
eral Circuit in Jazz Photo found that patent rights are not exhausted by a
first sale abroad, whereas the U.S. Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng found that
copyright rights are exhausted by a first sale abroad.174
The Federal Circuit found the Kirtsaeng holding inapplicable for sev-
eral reasons.175 First, Kirtsaeng did not address patent law.176 Kirtsaeng
interpreted the Copyright Act, with no mention of the Patent Act.177 Fur-
thermore, copyright law is much different from patent law because the
Copyright Act does not contain a “right to exclude anyone from” use,
and permits acts without the authority of the copyright owner.178 Kirt-
saeng also does not cite to any patent exhaustion cases.179 Second, there
are differences between the Copyright Act and patent law. Patent ex-
haustion requires a prior sale, whereas the Copyright Act does not.180
Moreover, the Patent Act refers to the manufacture, use, or sale of the
patented article, whereas the Copyright Act only refers to the manufac-
ture of the copyrighted work.181 As a result, the Federal Circuit found
that Kirtsaeng was not controlling of the analysis.182
165. Id.
166. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc. 816 F.3d 721, 755–58 (Fed. Cir. 2016),
rev’d, Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
167. Id. at 727.
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The Federal Circuit also found that public policy and logistics sup-
ported its position. For example, the “reward” of a patent is the right to
exclude others “in the United States,” not abroad.183 Furthermore, the
award of a patent is country specific.184 Copyright registration is not
country specific because it occurs without government approval.185 Cur-
rently, Congress has refused to expand a patent owner’s right.186 Finally,
the Federal Circuit would cause “significant disruption of existing prac-
tices” if it overturned Jazz Photo.187 As a result, the Federal Circuit up-
held Jazz Photo and found that the first foreign sale of a patented article
abroad “does not exhaust the patentee’s U.S. patent rights.”188
On December 2, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari re-
garding the issue of whether a sale of a patented product exhausts both
domestic and international rights.189 The results of the Supreme Court’s
decision will be reported in the following Survey for the next Survey
period.
C. INTER PARTES REVIEW
Inter partes review filings have remained consistent over the past
year.190 Cuozzo is an important case dealing with inter partes reviews,
and several following cases have applied Cuozzo.
Chart 1. Number of AIA Petitions Filed by Fiscal Year by Type191
183. Id.
184. Id. at 762.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 767.
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188. Id. at 774. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision in Lexmark after the
Survey period. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1532 (2017).
189. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 546 (2016).
190. See infra note 191.
191. Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics, USPTO 3 (July 31, 2016), https://www
.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-07-31%20PTAB.pdf [https://perma.cc/FB3P-
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2017] Intellectual Property 253
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has made several
important rulings following Cuozzo. In the first case, the Federal Circuit
found that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (PTAB) decision whether
to institute an inter partes review proceeding based on an assessment of
statutory timebar is not subject to judicial review.192
1. Cuozzo and a Time Bar—Click-to-Call v. Oracle
In Click-to-Call, the PTAB determined that the patent at issue was un-
patentable.193 The patent owner appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal.
Click-to-Call (CTC) “appealed from a final written decision” from the
PTAB, arguing that the “[inter partes review] proceedings should have
been barred by 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).”194 The Federal Circuit then dis-
missed CTC’s appeal because of a lack of jurisdiction, as set forth in
Achates where the Federal Circuit held that “a party cannot challenge the
Board’s decision to institute an [inter partes review] proceeding under
§ 315(b)[.]”195 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the
previous judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in
light of Cuozzo.196
CTC argued that Cuozzo required the Federal Circuit to reconsider
Achates because “the time bar under § 315(b) is not closely related to the
Board’s decision to institute under § 314(a).”197 Oracle Corp. (Oracle)
and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) argued that Cuozzo
supported the holding in Achates because the timebar is “closely tied to
those statutes authorizing the PTO to act.”198
In Wi-Fi One, “a majority of the panel determined that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Cuozzo did not overrule [the Federal Circuit’s] previ-
ous decision in Achates and that later panels of the court remain bound
by Achates.”199 The Federal Circuit held that since it is bound by Wi-Fi, it
is also bound by Achates.200 Thus, the Federal Circuit dismissed “CTC’s
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”201
2. Cuozzo and PTAB Independence—Magnum Oil Tools
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed several
burden-shifting issues in In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd.202 McClinton
Energy Group (McClinton) filed an inter partes review petition of a pat-
192. Click-to-Call Techs., LP v. Oracle Corp., No. 2015-1242, 2016 WL 6803054, at *1
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ent owned by Magnum Oil Tools International (Magnum).203 The PTAB
instituted the petition and held that all challenged claims of the patent
were obvious. Magnum appealed the PTAB’s decision.204 The Board
scrutinized three primary references and a tool catalog, referred to as
Cockrell, Kristiansen, Lehr, and Alpha, respectively.
McClinton argued that all the claims were “obvious over Alpha . . . in
combination with Cockrell and Kristiansen.”205 McClinton “also noted
that the claims would have been obvious over the combination of Lehr as
a base reference (in view of Cockrell and Kristiansen), McClinton largely
‘incorporated by reference’ its arguments on Lehr from its earlier argu-
ments based on Alpha.”206 The PTAB instituted the inter partes review
“based on Lehr in view of Cockrell and Kristiansen, but not on the basis
of Alpha.”207 Magnum argued for a rehearing, claiming that the “Board
had relied on a ‘new ground of unpatentability’ regarding a skilled arti-
san’s motivation to combine Lehr with Cockrell and Kristiansen.”208 Fur-
thermore, Magnum claimed that “there was no evidence supporting the
[PTAB’s] finding.”209 The PTAB denied Magnum’s request.210
The USPTO claimed that the PTAB’s decision is unreviewable under
Cuozzo.211 Magnum argued that it is “not challenging the Board’s deci-
sion to institute the [inter partes review], but rather the Board’s state-
ments made regarding obviousness of the claimed invention, some of
which were made in the Board’s institution decision and later relied upon
in the Board’s final written decision.”212 The PTAB found that it had
jurisdiction because “[n]othing in either 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) or Cuozzo
Speed Techs. shields aspects of a Board decision [that] are critical to its
ultimate judgment merely because its final analysis relies on statements
made when it initially considered the petition.”213
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the USPTO’s argument that the
“burden of production shifts to the patentee upon the Board’s conclusion
in an institution decision that ‘there is a reasonable likelihood that the
petitioner would prevail.’”214 The USPTO’s proposal goes against the
Federal Circuit’s precedent, where the decision to institute and final deci-
sion are “two very different analyses.”215 Additionally, there is a “‘signifi-
cant difference’ between the standards of proof at institution and trial
during an [inter partes review].”216 The petitioner must retain the “bur-
203. Id. at 1367.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1372.
206. Id.
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den of proving unpatentability after institution.”217 It would be “inappro-
priate” to put a burden of patentability on the patentee after
institution.218
The Federal Circuit agreed with Magnum’s claims that the PTAB “im-
properly shifted the burden to it, as the patentee, to prove nonobvious-
ness.”219 Magnum claimed that McClinton never explained “why a skilled
artisan would have sought to combine the asserted prior art refer-
ences.”220 McClinton argued Alpha as a primary base reference, not
Lehr, which is the reference that the PTAB used to institute the inter
partes review.221 The Federal Circuit reversed the decision because “Mc-
Clinton failed to separately meet its burden of establishing obviousness in
view of Lehr, Cockrell, and Kristiansen[.]”222
The PTAB improperly shifted the burden to Magnum when it expected
Magnum to explain why the obviousness argument that was used on Al-
pha, Cockrell, and Kristiansen was not applicable to Lehr, Cockrell, and
Kristiansen.223 Furthermore, Lehr and Alpha operate in “different man-
ners,” and no one gave an explanation of why “combining the first set of
references equally applies to the second set of references.”224 As a result,
the Federal Circuit reversed the decision because of the incorrect place-
ment of the burden of persuasion.225
The Federal Circuit also found that since McClinton never explained
“why a skilled artisan would have sought to combine the prior art refer-
ences to achieve the claimed invention, the Board had no basis for its
conclusion that McClinton had met its burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the claimed invention would have been obvi-
ous.”226 Furthermore, the PTAB cannot adopt arguments that McClinton
should have made but never actually did make.227 Thus, the Federal Cir-
cuit held that “while the PTO has broad authority to establish procedures
for revisiting earlier-granted patents in [inter partes reviews], that author-
ity is not so broad that it allows the PTO to raise, address, and decide
unpatentability theories never presented by the petitioner and not sup-
ported by record evidence.”228
217. Id. at 1376–77.
218. Id. at 1376.
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3. Cuozzo and Reconsideration of a Review Request—Medtronic v.
Bosch
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has also found that
vacating institution decisions and terminating proceedings because of a
failure to comply with the “requirement that all real parties in interest be
disclosed” are both barred from review by § 314(d).229
In Medtronic, Bosch sued Cardiocom, alleging patent infringement.230
Cardiocom filed petitions for inter partes review for the patents at is-
sue.231 The petitions were denied.232 Cardiocom is a subsidiary of Med-
tronic.233 Medtronic then filed petitions seeking inter partes review on
the same patents at issue and listed only itself as “the sole real party in
interest.”234 Bosch “argued that the petitions should be denied because
Medtronic had failed to name Cardiocom as a real party in interest as
required by 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2).”235 The PTAB instituted the petitions,
but after additional discovery, granted Bosch’s motion to terminate the
proceedings because Medtronic failed to name all real parties in inter-
est.236 Medtronic appealed the decision, and Bosch claimed that the
PTAB’s decisions were not appealable under § 314(d).237 The Federal
Circuit dismissed Medtronic’s appeals and “denied mandamus relief in a
non-precedential order.”238 In light of the Cuozzo ruling, the Federal Cir-
cuit recalled its mandate.239
In performing its analysis, the Federal Circuit focused on whether the
current challenge is “closely related” to “the application and interpreta-
tion of statutes related to the Patent Office’s decision to initiate inter
partes review.”240 The reconsideration of the PTAB’s decision is not re-
viewable for a couple reasons. First, the PTAB’s “reconsideration was
predicated on a failure to meet the statutory requirements for filing a
petition under § 312(a)[.]”241 Second, it would be “strange to hold that a
decision to institute review would not be reviewable but a reconsidera-
tion of that decision would be reviewable.”242 The Federal Circuit found
that the request to reconsider a decision whether to institute an inter
partes review is a nonappealable decision under Cuozzo because the
PTAB’s “reconsideration in this case is fairly characterized as a decision
whether to institute proceedings, the review of which is barred by
229. Medtronic, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Healthcare Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1382, 1383–84
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
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§ 314(d).”243
4. Future Cuozzo Questions—Aqua Products
In Aqua Products, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
vacated its previous opinion and granted a petition for rehearing en
banc.244 Once again, the burden of persuasion and production is at issue.
The Federal Circuit requested supplemental briefs on the following
questions:
(1) When the patent owner moves to amend its claims under 35
U.S.C. § 316(d), may the PTO require the patent owner to bear the
burden of persuasion, or a burden of production, regarding patenta-
bility of the amended claims as a condition of allowing them? Which
burdens are permitted under 35 U.S.C. § 316(e)?245
(2) When the petitioner does not challenge the patentability of a
proposed amended claim, or the Board thinks the challenge is inade-
quate, may the Board sua sponte raise patentability challenges to
such a claim? If so, where would the burden of persuasion, or a bur-
den of production, lie?246
There are still many questions remaining pertaining to the inter partes
review process. It will be interesting to see if there is a shift regarding the
burden of persuasion and the burden of production in 2017. It is also
interesting to see how the courts will continue to apply Cuozzo in the
upcoming year.
III. TRADEMARK UPDATE
A. A LOW BAR TO REGISTRATION—CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP
CHURCH V. ADIDAS
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Trade-
mark Trial and Appeal Board’s cancellation of trademarks owned by the
Christian Faith Fellowship Church (the Church), finding that intrastate
sales to out-of-state residents fell within the broad powers of the Com-
merce Clause.247
In 2005, in connection with a fundraising campaign, the Church began
selling apparel displaying the phrase “ADD A ZERO.”248 Thereafter,
the Church applied for and obtained two U.S. Federal registrations for
the mark, relying on actual use in commerce (as opposed to an intent-to-
use in commerce). In 2009, Adidas sought registration of the mark
“ADIZERO,” but encountered a refusal based on the Church’s prior re-
gistrations, spurring Adidas to bring a cancellation action before the
243. Id.
244. In re Aqua Prods., Inc., 833 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
245. Id. at 1336.
246. Id.
247. See Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
248. Id. at 988.
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Board. In the cancellation action, Adidas argued in part that the Church’s
registrations were void since the Church had failed to use the marks “in
commerce” before registration, as required by the Lanham Act. The
Board agreed with Adidas, finding that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that a sale of one shirt and one cap from the Church’s bookstore
constituted “interstate commerce.”249
In its ruling reversing the Board’s decision, the Federal Circuit broke
down § 1051(a) of the Lanham Act in determining what is required of
mark owners to obtain a federal registration.250 In doing so, the Federal
Circuit determined that “to register a mark under § 1051(a), one must sell
or transport goods bearing the mark such that the sale or transport would
be subject to Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause[.]”251 After
finding that the evidence on the record demonstrated that the Church
had made an intrastate sale of its apparel to an out-of-state resident, the
Federal Circuit analyzed whether such activities fell within the purview of
Congress under the Commerce Clause (which would thus satisfy the Lan-
ham Act’s “use in commerce” requirement).252
Turning to the Commerce Clause, the Federal Circuit recognized at the
outset that “Congress’s power under the . . . Clause is broad.”253 Indeed,
the Federal Circuit noted that contemporary decisions illustrate that Con-
gress has the power to “regulate activities that have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce,” and even purely local activities may have such
an effect.254 After summarizing three U.S. Supreme Court cases address-
ing the broad reach of the Commerce Clause, as well as one of its own
prior decisions on the topic,255 the Federal Circuit held that “it [was]
clear” that the sale of two hats bearing the Church’s trademark “to an
out-of-state resident is regulable by Congress under the Commerce
Clause[.]”256 Indeed, the Federal Circuit stated that “the transaction at
issue falls comfortably within the bounds of those powers already
sketched for us by the Supreme Court.”257 Not only did the Federal Cir-
cuit find that the economic activity of selling a product to an out-of-state
resident was enough to satisfy the Lanham Act requirement, but it re-
minded the parties (and the TTAB) that the Commerce Clause does not
249. Adidas AG v. Christian Faith Fellowship Church, Cancelation No. 9205331, 2015
WL 5882313, at *6 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 14, 2015), rev’d and remanded, 841 F.3d 986 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
250. See Christian Faith Fellowship Church, 841 F.3d at 989.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 990.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 991; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2 (2005) (the growth of marijuana
for personal, medicinal use only and not to sell or transport the drug, was found to be part
of “an economic ‘class of acitvities’ that have a substantial effect on intersate commerce”).
255. See Christian Faith Fellowship Church, 841 F.3d at 990–94 (citing Gonzales, 545
U.S. at 1; Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074 (2016); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Williams Rest. Corp., 929 F.2d 662 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
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257. Id.
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require any proof as to the activities’ actual effects on interstate com-
merce.258 Thus, despite the Church’s sales being “de minimis” in nature,
they were sufficient to support a federal registration.259 The Federal Cir-
cuit left no question that the bar to establish “use in commerce” for pur-
poses of obtaining a federal trademark registration is very low, due to the
broad reach of Congress’s powers to regulate commercial activity under
the Commerce Clause. In the end, the Federal Circuit reversed the can-
cellation of the Church’s marks and remanded the case to the TTAB for
further review.260
B. PROTECTION OF FOREIGN TRADEMARKS IN THE UNITED STATES—
BELMORA V. BAYER
In an important decision for companies engaging in global commerce,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that owners
of well-known foreign marks are permitted to pursue Lanham Act claims
relating to false association and false advertising, as well as trademark
cancellation, in the United States.261
The plaintiff, Bayer Consumer Care AG (Bayer), has been in the busi-
ness of selling naproxen sodium pain relievers in Mexico under the regis-
tered trademark “FLANAX” since the 1970s.262 Some of Bayer’s sales
over the years occurred near the Mexican-American border. The defen-
dant, Belmora LLC (Belmora), began engaging in selling naproxen so-
dium pain relievers in the United States in 2004 and obtained a U.S.
trademark registration a year later.263 In the case, Bayer and its U.S. sis-
ter company alleged that Belmora registered and used the FLANAX
trademark with the intent to deceive Mexican-American consumers into
believing they were purchasing Bayer’s products.
The evidence showed that, in addition to using and registering an iden-
tical name, Belmora initially sold its products in packaging resembling
Bayer’s own FLANAX-branded packaging.264 Belmora also employed
telemarketers who referred to Belmora’s product as the “FLANAX in
the US” and referred to Bayer’s Latino FLANAX product routinely.265
Bayer pursued a successful cancellation before the TTAB of Belmora’s
FLANAX registration based on a Lanham Act false association claim.266
However, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (re-
lying on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lexmark International, Inc.
258. See id. at 993.
259. Id. at 994.
260. Id. at 995.
261. Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 1202 (2017).
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v. Static Control Components, Inc.)267 held that Bayer did not have stand-
ing to bring Lanham Act claims within the United States because Bayer
did not have a protectable interest in the FLANAX mark in the United
States and further because there cannot be a “cognizable economic loss”
when a mark is not used in U.S. commerce.268
In reversing the lower court’s ruling, the Fourth Circuit first set forth
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which provides an unfair competition claim
for false association and false advertising.269 Of great import was the fact
that the plain language of the Section does not require that the plaintiff
have possessed or used a trademark within U.S. commerce, whereas
other sections of the Lanham Act do explicitly require use in com-
merce.270 Rather, a false association claim on § 43(a) merely requires that
one party’s use of a “word, term name, symbol, or device” in connection
with goods or services “is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of [the party’s] goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person.”271 Thus, in the case at hand, Belmora’s use
of the FLANAX mark was the “alleged offending ‘word, term, name,
symbol, or device.’”272
Contrary to the district court’s application, the Fourth Circuit, also ana-
lyzing the case under Lexmark, applied traditional rules of statutory in-
terpretation and found that the district court erred in requiring Bayer to
plead its prior use of the mark in the United States in order to bring a
Lanham Act claim.273 Rather, the Fourth Circuit noted, the statute
clearly focuses on the defendant’s use.274 The Fourth Circuit found that
the district court had “conflated” § 43(a) of the Lanham Act with the
“infringement provision in § 32.”275 Also of significance to the Fourth
Circuit was the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition that § 43(a) “goes be-
yond trademark protection” and can extend to even generic marks.276
Thus, if § 43(a) can provide protection to the previous owner of a mark
that has become generic (and thus can no longer be owned as a trade-
mark), it was clear to the Fourth Circuit that “§ 43(a) actions do not re-
quire, implicitly or otherwise, that a plaintiff have first used its own mark
in United States Commerce.”277
Next, the Fourth Circuit had to determine whether Bayer had suffi-
ciently pled that it was “likely to be damaged” by the defendant’s use of
267. 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388–90 (applying the “zone of interests” test to determine
whether a cause of action extends to a particular plaintiff).
268. Belmora, 819 F.3d at 705.
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the allegedly offending word or term, as required by § 43(a).278 The
Fourth Circuit held that Bayer’s allegations of significant losses of sales
stemming from Mexican-American consumers located near the border
who would forgo purchases of Bayer’s product in Mexico was enough to
meet the pleading requirement as to proximate cause established in
Lexmark.279
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit held that Bayer could also bring its false
advertising claim on § 43(a), as well as a cancellation claim under § 14(3)
of the Lanham Act, which allows for a petition to cancel a trademark
registration by any party who “believes that he is or will be damaged.”280
The case was ultimately reversed and remanded. Belmora filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the Supreme Court that was denied.281
IV. COPYRIGHT UPDATE
A. COPYRIGHT IN CHEERLEADER’S CHEVRONS AND STRIPES?—
VARSITY BRANDS V. STAR ATHLETICA
In Varsity Brands v. Star Athletica, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that the Copyright Act protects graphic features of a
design even where those features cannot be physically separated from the
useful article.282
At the heart of the case was the question, “[a]re cheerleading uniforms
truly cheerleading uniforms without the stripes, chevrons, zigzags, and
color blocks?”283 The plaintiff-appellants, Varsity Brands (and others),
own copyright registrations for a number of designs that they imprint on
“cheerleading uniforms and warm-ups they sell.”284 The defendant-appel-
lees sell cheerleading uniforms bearing designs that the plaintiffs allege
“are substantially similar” to its copyrighted designs.285 The U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Tennessee held that since the registered
designs were not “physically or conceptually separable from the utilita-
rian function of a cheerleading uniform” (because a cheerleading uniform
would not be a cheerleading uniform without its designs), the copyright
registrations were invalid and entered summary judgment in favor of Star
Athletica.286
In reversing the district court holding, the Sixth Circuit focused on the
requirements to show infringement of a valid copyright.287 Specifically, in
this context, infringement of Varsity’s copyright required that Varsity
278. Id. at 711–12.
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281. Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 137 S. Ct. 1202 (2017).
282. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2015), aff’d,
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“owned a valid copyright in [its] designs” and Star Athletic “copied pro-
tectable elements of the work.”288
In determining whether Varsity held valid copyrights, the Sixth Circuit
first noted the presumption of validity given to a registered copyright and
evaluated the level of deference that must be given to the Copyright Of-
fice’s determination that the designs are “non-functional and separable
from the ‘utilitarian aspects of the article’ to which they are affixed.”289
The Sixth Circuit held that, since decisions related to the copyrightability
of works were not akin to “rules carrying the force of law,” the Copyright
Office should be given greater deference (namely, Skidmore deference)
than that which the district court afforded.290 In addition, the Sixth Cir-
cuit noted that “the Copyright Office’s expertise in identifying and think-
ing about the difference between art and function [of a work] surpasses”
the Sixth Circuit’s expertise.291
In determining whether an article constitutes a protectable work, the
Sixth Circuit laid out the language of the Copyright Act and explained
that a two-part inquiry must be pursued. First, the question must be an-
swered “whether the design for which the author seeks copyright protec-
tion is a ‘design of a useful article[.]’”292 If so, the court must ask if the
“pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features” of the article are separable
from, or in other words, can exist “independently of[ ] the utilitarian as-
pects” of the article.293 To determine the separability of a “pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural feature” of a work, courts look to “physical separa-
bility and conceptual separability.”294 The Sixth Circuit laid out the nu-
merous approaches employed by the Copyright Office and other courts,
all of which have grappled with the idea of conceptual-separability over
the years, and found that the best approach is to lay out a series of ques-
tions related to the text of the Copyright Act.295 One portion in particular
of the Sixth Circuit’s analysis was significant for the question of separabil-
ity. Specifically, if the useful article’s function does not require the “picto-
rial, graphic, or sculptural features” or such features are “wholly
unnecessary to performance of the utilitarian function,” then the features
can exist without the useful article and vice versa.296
Applying its pronounced rule to the facts at hand, the Sixth Circuit
found that Varsity’s designs could exist independently of the cheerleading
uniforms as they could be transferred to a variety of garments and medi-
ums, such as canvases.297 The Sixth Circuit rejected Star’s argument that
the ornamental features of the uniforms were “inextricably intertwined
288. Id. at 476.
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with the utilitarian aspects . . . because they serve a decorative func-
tion.”298 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit pronounced that such a rule “would
render nearly all artwork unprotectable.”299 The Sixth Circuit was careful
to limit its holding by distinguishing between fabric designs and dress de-
signs, which serve the purpose of covering and protecting the body, and
which cannot be separated from the utilitarian aspects of the clothing.300
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion was recently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme
Court.301
V. WHAT PRACTIONERS SHOULD WATCH FOR IN 2017–2018
The U.S. Supreme Court was very active in the intellectual property
field after the Survey Period ended, having granted certiorari and issued
opinions in several IP cases302 following the Survey Period.303
In trademarks, the U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether the dis-
paragement provision of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), is uncon-
stitutional for violating the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.304 The specific portion of § 1052(a) at issue relates to the
refusal to register any trademark that may disparage persons, institutions,
or beliefs.305 In 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
found that the relevant section did, in fact, violate the Free Speech
Clause, but limited its holding to that particular portion of the Statute.306
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, however, could implicate additional
aspects of the statute that refuse registration for trademarks deemed “im-
moral, deceptive, or scandalous.”307 The case could also determine a cur-
rently pending case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, where the issue revolves around whether the football team name
“Redskins” disparages against the Native American population and
therefore should not be entitled to its federal trademark registration.308
In addition, the Supreme Court’s decision has the ability to vastly change
the face of the trademark register. If the Supreme Court deems the rele-
vant portions of the Statute unconstitutional, the USPTO could expect an
influx of “spirited” mark applications and potential action by Congress.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Developments during the Survey period continue to clarify the scope
of intellectual property rights and liability for infringement. For example,
the Supreme Court’s decision in Samsung provides certainty that design
patent damages are not necessarily attributable to an entire product. Fur-
thermore, guidance on enhanced damages and the standard for institu-
tion of and claim interpretation during inter partes review proceedings
was provided. In Adidas, the bar to federal trademark registration was
confirmed to be low due to the broad reach of Congress’s power under
the Commerce Clause and foreign mark owners were given a leg up in
asserting their rights in the United States in Belmora. In summary, the
Survey period reflects changes in the law that, although not fundamental,
result in greater certainty and efficiency in resolving IP disputes.
